enhanced interrogation techniques pdf

CIA managers who, were aware of failings and shortcomings in the program but did not intervene, or who failed to. That individual acknowledged lacking, the requisite expertise to review the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation, techniques, and concluded only that "the program," meaning all CIA detainee reporting, regardless of whether it was connected to the use of the CIA's enhanced inteiTogation, techniques, was a "great success. #6: The CIA has actively avoided or impeded congressional oversight of the program. Market data provided by Factset. “Enhanced Interrogation” Explained The CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program allowed the use of so-called “enhanced interrogation techniques” on detainees captured after 9/11. Psychological theory and research shows that harsh interrogation enhanced interrogation noun (In the terminology of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency) a type of interrogation incorporating procedures that apply extreme physical and psychological stress to subjects in order to compel them to cooperate; frequently attributive in "enhanced interrogation technique". The tarp would be pulled up around them to make a bathtub. Additionally, multiple detainees were subjected to, techniques that were applied in ways that diverged from the specific authorization, or were, subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques by interrogators who had not been authorized to, use them. From 2002 to 2007, the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) within the Department of Justice relied, on CIA representations regarding: (1) the conditions of confinement for detainees, (2) the, applicationof the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, (3) the physical effects of the, techniques on detainees, and (4) the effectiveness of the techniques. In some cases, there was no, relationship between the cited counterterrorism success and any information provided by, detainees during or after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. 12. #11: The CIA was unprepared as it began operating its Detention and Interrogation. The CIA led, several detainees to believe they would never be allowed to leave CIA custody alive, suggesting, to one detainee that he would only leave in a coffin-shaped box.^ Oneinterrogator told another, detainee that he would never go to court, because "we can never let the world know what I have, done to you. These, challenges became increasingly difficult over time. Perspectives on Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Congressional Research Service 2 This report discusses the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation (D&I) Program as portrayed in many official documents. This includes the provision of inaccurate statements similar to those provided to other elements, of the U.S. Government and later to the public, as well as instances in which specific questions, from White House officials were not answered truthfully or fully. Detainees provided, fabricated information on critical intelligence issues, including the terrorist threats which the. The use of coercive interrogation techniques and covert detention facilities that did not meet, traditional U.S. standards resulted in the FBI and the Department of Defense limiting their. The ODNI was providedwith inaccurate and incomplete information about the program, preventing the director of national intelligencefrom effectively carrying out the director's. The CIA did not hold any detainees after April 2008.” 16 In reference to DOD requests, see for example, James T. Hill, Commander, U.S. Southern Command, “Counter-Resistance Techniques,” memorandum to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, October 25, 2002, and Diane E. The examples provided by the. "^ CIA officers also threatened at least three detainees withharm to theirfamilies—, to include threats to harm the children of a detainee, threats to sexually abuse the mother of a, detainee, and a threat to "cut [a detainee's] mother's throat. members that related to CIA inteiTogation activities. 6. In part to avoid declaring Abu Zubaydah to the. CIA medical personnel, treated at least one detainee for swelling in order to allow the continued use of standing sleep, At least five CIA detainees were subjectedto "rectal rehydration" or rectal feeding without, documented medical necessity. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed. #2: The CIA's justification for the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques rested on. See what's new with book lending at the Internet Archive, Uploaded by The CIA did not brief the leadership of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on the, CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques until September 2002, after the techniques had been, approved and used. techniques’ from torture, in claiming that ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ only created discom- fort, not pain. #7: The CIA impeded effective White House oversight and decision-making. Examples of these concerns include CIA officers questioning the effectiveness of the CIA's, enhanced interrogation techniques, interrogators disagreeing with the use of such techniques, against detainees whom they determined were not withholding information, psychologists, recommending less isolated conditions, and Office of Medical Services personnel questioning, both the effectiveness and safety of the techniques. prompted the CIA to move detainees out of a CIAdetention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Abu Zubaydah became "completely unresponsive, with bubbles rising through his open, full mouth." May 2004 "Special Review" of the program that identified significant concerns and deficiencies. This prevented an accurate and, complete understanding of the program by Executive Branch officials, thereby impeding, According to CIA records, no CIA officer, up to and including CIA Directors George Tenet and, Porter Goss, briefed the president on the specific CIA enhanced interrogation techniques before, April 2006. 4. the use of interrogation techniques similar to torture only in the case that the techniques a re used “for the purposes of eliciting information in an interrogation process“. information to justify the detention of many other detainees. There are no CIA records to indicate that any of the reviews independently validated the, "effectiveness" claims presented by the CIA, to include basic confirmation that the intelligence, cited by the CIA was acquired from CIA detainees during or after the use of the CIA's enhanced, interrogation techniques. coercive interrogation techniques. #9; The CIA impeded oversight by the CIA's Office of Inspector General. operations. The CIA provided extensive amounts of inaccurate and incomplete information related to the, operation and effectiveness of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program to the White, House, the National Security Council principals, and their staffs. Central to the debate on the use of “enhanced” interrogation techniques is the question of whether those techniques are effective in gaining intelligence. '"^ Internal CIA records describe the waterboarding of Khalid Shaykh Mohammad as, evolving into a "series of near drownings. You've successfully subscribed to this newsletter! The interrogator has the detainee reach out his arms toward the wall so that his fingers are touching it. For instance, a detainee would be forced to stand for prolonged periods while nude. Many notable thinkers are, and will continue to … interrogation operations. With the exception of Country the CIA, was forced to relocate detainees out of every country in which it established a detention facility. Ability to Quickly Acquire High Value Information. At a Presidential Daily Briefing session that day, the president approved CIA's. An, internal CIA email from July 2003 noted that "... theWH [White House] is extremely concerned, [Secretary] Powell would blow his stack if he were to be briefed on what's been going on. Other detainees provided significant accurate intelligence prior to, or without having been, While being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and afterwards, multiple, CIA detainees fabricated information, resulting in faulty intelligence. The extant research on techniques of interviewing and interrogation is a prime example; new studies have emerged examining broad (mac-rolevel) interrogation approaches, specific (microlevel) interrogation techniques,andnowevenintermediary(mesolevel)categorizationsof those techniques (Kelly et al., 2013). In 2007, Director Hayden ordered an unprecedented review of the OIG itself in. Significant events, to include the death and injury of CIA detainees, the detention of individuals, who did not meet the legal standard to be held, the use of unauthorized interrogation techniques, against CIA detainees, and the provision of inaccurate information on the CIA program did not, result in appropriate, effective, or in many eases, any corrective actions. [C]ongress reads it, cuts our authorities, messes up, ourbudget... weeither put outour story or wegeteaten. The CIA used these examples to claim that its enhanced interrogation techniques were not only, effective, but also necessary to acquire "otherwise unavailable" actionable intelligence that, The Committee reviewed 20 of the most frequent and prominent examples of purported, counterterrorism successes that the CIA has attributed to the use of its enhanced interrogation, techniques, and found them to be wrong in fundamental respects. It was conducted between 2002 and 2009, with the authorization of officials in the Bush Administration’s White House and the Department of Justice. CIA statements, to the Committee and later to the public that the CIA detained fewer than 100 individuals, and, that less than a third of those 100detainees were subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation, techniques, were inaccurate. Beginning in early 2005, the CIA sought unsuccessfully to convince the U.S. Department of, Defense to allow the transfer of numerous CIA detainees to U.S. military custody. In late 2005 and in 2006, the Detainee Treatment Act and then the U.S. Supreme Couit decision, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeldcaused the CIA to again temporarily suspend the use of its enhanced, By 2006, press disclosures, the unwillingness of other countries to host existing or new detention, sites, and legal and oversight concerns had largely ended the CIA's ability to operate clandestine, After detaining at least 113 individuals through 2004, the CIA brought only six additional, detainees into its custody: four in 2005, one in 2006, and one in 2007. interrogations or coercive interrogation techniques. The detainee would have to hold that position indefinitely, according to a description by Rizzo about this technique used on Zubaydah. Conditions at CIA detention sites were poor, and were especially bleak early in the program. The road to torture: How the CIA's "enhanced interrogation techniques” became legal after 9/11 The CIA’s torture techniques—10 in total—increased in severity as one went down the list. On the CIA's behalf, the contract psychologists developed theories of interrogation based on, "learned helplessness,"^^ and developed the list of enhanced inteiTogation techniques thatwas, approved for use against Abu Zubaydah and subsequent CIA detainees. Contrary to CIA representations to the Department of Justice, the CIA instructed personnel that, the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah would take "precedence" over his medical care,^ resulting in, the deterioration of a bullet wound Abu Zubaydah incurred during his capture. * CIA detainees who were subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. 13. More specifically that they were reverse-engineered by psychological consultants Mitchell and Jes-sen1 (contracted by the CIA) from the SERE program—a training program to enable captured military personnel to survive, evade, resist (interrogations), and escape if cap- In one instance, Zubaydah was slammed against a concrete wall, the Senate report said. At least five detainees, experienced disturbing hallucinations during prolonged sleep deprivation and, in at least two of. Homeland. standing in the world, and resulted in other significant monetary and non-monetary costs. Cramped Confinement — The interrogator would put the detainee in a box, sometimes big enough to stand in, for up to 18 hours, or one only big enough to curl up in for up to two hours, Rizzo said in his book. Mike Casey, the former Department of Justice attorney general, wrote in an … In 2006, the value of the CIA's base conti"act with the company formed by the psychologists with, all options exercised was in excess of $180 million; the contractors received $81 million prior to, the contract's termination in 2009. impeded, the national security missions of other Executive Branch agencies. Here are the methods, as listed by a May 30, 2005, Justice Department memo to the CIA: 1. Program more than six months after being granted detention authorities. Although these incidents were recorded in CIA cables and, in at least some cases were, identified at the time by supervisors at CIA Headquarters as being inappropriate, corrective. ©2021 FOX News Network, LLC. interrogation techniques and extended isolation exhibited psychological and behavioral issues. The CIA placed detainees in ice water "baths." The inaccurate information was, included in the final May 2004 Special Review, which was later declassified and released, In 2005, CIA Director Goss requested in writing that the inspector general not initiate further, reviews of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program until reviews already underway were, completed. The CI^)laced ajunior officer with no relevant, experience in charge of COBALT. the Department of Justice, and the White House. CIA attorneys stated that "a novel application of the, necessity defense" could be used "to avoid prosecution of U.S. officials who tortured to obtain, Having reviewed information provided by the CIA, the OLC included the "necessity defense" in, its August 1, 2002, memorandum to the White House counsel on Standards of Conductfor, Interrogation. its interrogation activities over the course of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. Prior to mid-2004, the CIA routinely subjected detainees to nudity and dietary manipulation. The CIA's claims about the number of detainees held and subjected to its. Be the first one to, Senate Report on CIA Torture - 2014 - PDF - Download, Advanced embedding details, examples, and help, Terms of Service (last updated 12/31/2014). Briefings to the full Conmiittee beginning on September 6, 2006, also contained, numerous inaccui*acies, including inaccurate descriptions of how interrogation techniques were, applied and what information was obtained from CIA detainees. Proponents of ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ in the United States have claimed that such methods are necessary for obtaining information from uncooperative terrorism subjects. including hallucinations, paranoia, insomnia, and attempts at self-harm and self-mutilation. CIADirector George Tenet issued formal guidelines for, interrogations and conditions of confinement at detention sites in January 2003, by which time. OLC. For instance, in August of 2002, Zubaydah was put on a liquid diet that consisted of Ensure and water, the Senate report said. In two other countries where negotiations on hosting new, CIA detention facilities were takingplace,the CIA told local government officials not to. In 2005, the psychologists formed a company specifically for the purpose of conducting their. enhanced interrogation techniques on November 8, 2007. "^^ Another seniorCIAofficer stated that, COBALT was itself an enhancedinterrogation technique.^', At times, the detainees at COBALT were walked around naked or were shackled with their, hands above their heads for extended periods of time. #20; The CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program damaged the United States'. In at least two, other cases, the CIA used its enhanced interrogation techniques despite warnings from CIA, medical personnel that the techniques could exacerbate physical injuries. On two occasions in which the CIA inspector general identified wrongdoing, accountability, recommendations were ovennled by senior CIA leadership. Zubaydah was described as "hysterical" after these sessions and "distressed to a level that he was unable to effectively communicate." CIA officers prepared documents indicating, that "critical portions of the Report are patently false or misleading, especially certain key factual, claims..CIA Director Hayden testified to the Committee that "numerous false allegations of, physical and threatened abuse and faulty legal assumptions and analysis in the [ICRC] report, #19; The CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program was inherently unsustainable and, had effectively ended by 2006 due to unauthorized press disclosures, reduced cooperation. Two psychologists who were paid more than $80 million by the CIA to develop "enhanced interrogation" techniques — which have been called torture — … That legislation was, approved by the Senate and the House of Representatives in Febniary 2008, and was vetoed by. and escalated to more coercive techniques only as necessary. was acquired from a CIA detainee "as a result" of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, when in fact the information was either: (1) corroborative of information already available to the, CIA or other elements of the U.S. Intelligence Community from sources other than the CIA, detainee, and was therefore not "otherwise unavailable"; or (2) acquired from the CIA detainee, prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. "^, Sleep deprivation involved keeping detainees awake for up to 180 hours, usually standing or in, stress positions, at times with their hands shackled above their heads. By 2006, the, CIA admitted in its own talking points for CIA Director Porter Goss that, absent an, Administration decision on an "endgame" for detainees, the CIA was "stymied" and "the, program could collapse of its own weight. JONES: Right. In the fall of 2001, the CIA, explored the possibility of establishing clandestine detention facilities in several countries. ""^, Lack of access to adequate medical care for detainees in countries hosting the CIA's detention, facilities caused recunring problems. involvement in CIA interrogation and detention activities. Get all the stories you need-to-know from the most powerful name in news delivered first thing every morning to your inbox. officers involved in or supporting CIA detention and interrogation operations. The OLC relied on inaccurate CIA representations about, Abu Zubaydah's status in al-Qa'ida and the interrogation team's "certain[ty]" that Abu, Zubaydah was withholding information about planned terrorist attacks. Thirteen "enhanced interrogation techniques" — interrogation methods — are at the center of the Senate Intelligence committee report about the CIA's use of harsh interrogation tactics after the Sept. 11, 2001, terror attacks. For example, in December 2003, CIA, personnel reported that they had made the "unsettling discovery" that the CIA had been "holding, a number of detainees about whom" the CIA knew "very litde" at multiple detention sites in, Divergent lines of authority for interrogationactivities persisted through at least 2003. [T]here is no middle ground. Neither psychologist had any experience as an, interrogator, nor did either have specialized knowledge of al-Qa'ida, a background in. In late March 2002, the imminent capture of Abu Zubaydah prompted the CIA to, again consider various detention options. The interrogator's hand is held with the fingers together and straight and slaps the detainee's abdomen. This included funding for the CIA to construct and maintain, detention facilities, including two facilities costing nearly $| million that were never used, in. Several SERE techniques are identical to the CIA’s “enhanced” interrogation methods employed by the military at Guantánamo and in Iraq. 40 of the 119 known detainees had been detained by the CIA. Zubaydah, for example, became "completely unresponsive, with bubbles rising through his open, full mouth. work with the CIA. Legal Statement. Detainees often remained in custody for months after, the CIA determined that they did not meet the MON standard. Untrained CIA officers at, the facility conducted frequent, unauthorized, and unsupervised interrogations of detainees using, harsh physical interrogation techniques that were not—and never became—part of the CIA's, formal "enhanced" interrogation program. statutory responsibility to serve as the principal advisor to the president on intelligence matters. If the techniques are the only way to get actionable intelligence that prevents terrorist attacks, their … KELLY: EITs being enhanced interrogation techniques. Abdominal Slap — The purpose was to cause the detainee to feel fear and despair, to punish certain behavior and humiliate or insult the detainee, according to a description in government documents, obtained by the American Civil Liberties Union in 2009. shackled in isolated cells with loud noise or music and only a bucket to use for human waste. In late 2001 and early 2002, senior attorneys at the CIA Office of General Counselfirst examined the legal implications of, using coercive interrogation techniques. impeding a proper legal analysis of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. All rights reserved. part due to host country political concerns. Mutual Fund and ETF data provided by Refinitiv Lipper. enhanced interrogation techniques were developed in the wake of 9/11. program. medical care to detainees upon CIA request. Mutual Fund and ETF data provided by Refinitiv Lipper. After about a month of detention and interrogation, the CIA recommended he be released to his village, but interrogators instead transferred him to the U.S. military, where he remained in custody for four years. The technique used by the Armed Forces or any other government branch in the U.S. has proven to be effective in getting people to talk much sooner. from other nations, and legal and oversight concerns. An "informal, operational assessment" of the program, led by two senior CIA officers who were not part of the, CIA's Counterterrorism Center, determined that it would not be possible to assess the, effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques without violating "Federal Policy. These concerns were regularly overridden by, CIA management, and the CIA made few corrective changes to its policies governing the, program. information from the use of the techniques. The U.S. Department of Defense also declined to provide. Waterboarding — The detainee is strapped to a board or bench, and water is poured over the detainees face to simulate drowning. There was little agreement among the dissidents who had been vigilant for a decade in calling attention to these egregious behaviors vs. those who believed that APA was not supporting torture in its policy and actions. "^, #4: The conditions of confinement for CIA detainees were harsher than the CIA had. This is not, the President's program. The CIA nonetheless failed to, take action to correct these representations, and allowed inaccurate information to remain as the, The CIA was also resistant to, and highly critical of more formal critiques. None of these techniques had been approved by the Department of Justice. The Facial Slap/Insult Slap — The interrogator slaps the detainee in the face, with fingers spread, striking between the chin and earlobe, Rizzo explained in his book. not contact other elements of the U.S. Government with interrogation expertise. acquiring intelligence or gaining cooperation from detainees. James E. Mitchell & John B. Jessen, Recognizing and Developing Countermeasures to Al Qaeda Resistance to Interrogation techniques: A Resistance Training Perspective. Top US Government officials including Dick Cheney, Colin Powell, George Tenet, Condoleezza Rice, Donald Rumsfeld, and John Ashcroft discussed at length whether or not the CIA could legally use harsh techniques against Abu Zubaydah.Condoleezza Rice specifically mentione… The CIA withheld or restricted information relevant to these, agencies' missions and responsibilities, denied access to detainees, and provided inaccurate. inaccurate and was similar to the inaccurate information provided by the CIA to the Congress. A discussion of 20 interrogation techniques must include the controversial enhanced interrogation techniques – the same interrogation techniques suggested for review by Mr. Becker at Guantanamo – including stress positions, prolonged isolation and sensory deprivation, threats of harm to … Quotes displayed in real-time or delayed by at least 15 minutes. Abu. At the time, no single unit at CIA Headquarters had clear responsibility for CIA detention and. "^'' The second reviewer concluded that "there is no objective. FACS is a By that time, 38 of the 39 detainees identified as having been subjected to the CIA's, enhanced interrogation techniques had already been subjected to the techniques.The CIA did, not inform the president or vice president of the location of CIA detention facilities other than, At the direction of the White House, the secretaries of state and defense - both principals on the, National Security Council - were not briefed on program specifics until September 2003. The CIA, in the conduct of its Detention and Interrogation Program, complicated, and in some, cases impeded, the national security missions of other Executive Branch agencies, including the, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the State Department, and the Office of the Director of, National Intelligence (ODNI). Mediocre or, I dare say, useless intelligence officers regularly called into question! Detention options ^ Internal CIA records describe the waterboarding of Khalid Shaykh Mohammad as, evolving into a ``.... Operating in only one country regularly overridden by, CIA management, were aware of failings and in... Operation and management, were also not held to account al-Qaida operative Abu Zubaydah in recent! Psychological and behavioral issues justification for the Protection of human Subjects '' regarding human.. In the ODNIreleasing of establishing clandestine detention facilities Inspector general identified wrongdoing, accountability recommendations! Read it on your Kindle device, PC, phones or tablets:! Fund and ETF data provided by Refinitiv Lipper your second home, here 's how much savings you should at... No reviews yet of otherwise unavailable intelligence '' that saved lives that the a concrete,! Techniques failed to over the detainees ' hands would be pulled up around them to a... Unavailable information poorly were rarely held accountable or removed from positions of responsibility of human Subjects '' human! Most significant detainees using these, techniques involved switching from solid foods liquid! Justify the detention of many other detainees Rasul v. Bush governing the, of! On Zubaydah — a detainee faces a wall, the CIA 's enhanced techniques... Impeded congressional oversight of the U.S. Department of Justice, and the contracted! Monetary and non-monetary costs detainee cooperation or produce accurate intelligence especially bleak early in the present article, offer! Or removed from positions of responsibility may 2004 `` Special Review '' of program. In January 2003, by which time deprivation and, in at least two of lists '' of the but! His hand — this technique involved switching from solid foods to liquid, became `` completely,... Director of national intelligencefrom effectively carrying enhanced interrogation techniques pdf the director of national intelligencefrom effectively out! Cia nonetheless continued the sleep deprivation and, in at least two of late March 2002, adetainee had... Recommendations were ovennled by senior CIA leadership several reports, including an important general identified wrongdoing,,... Psychologists identified the lack of human contact experienced by detainees as a `` dungeon these techniques had already subjected... Avoided or impeded congressional oversight of the program, preventing enhanced interrogation techniques pdf director of intelligencefrom... These agencies 's abdomen detainees face to simulate drowning toward the wall so that his fingers touching. ( SERE ) school '' the CIA nonetheless continued the sleep deprivation behavioral issues ``... Without approval by the CIA 's claim that the techniques failed to of Executive... From being turned over to another country for CIA detention sites in January 2003, al-Qaida Khalid... Stands about a foot from the detainee 's abdomen guidelines for, interrogations COBALT... Interrogator stands about a foot from the host government or public revelations about program! Were harsher than the CIA 's most significant detainees using these, techniques Department of Justice or had not authorized. Is strapped to a description by rizzo about this technique used on Zubaydah it began operating its detention interrogation... Of 2001, the OIG 's inquiries into the CIA nonetheless continued the sleep deprivation in October 2003 cultural... Identified the lack of CIA detainees were brutal and far worse than the CIA was... First thing every morning to your inbox are the methods, as listed a. Dietary manipulation — this technique involved switching from solid foods to liquid psychologists identified the lack of CIA,. Relevant, experience in charge of COBALT detainees after April 2008 at least minutes! Baths. — a detainee '' ^ Internal CIA records describe the waterboarding technique was physically harmful, inducing and! To know when buying your second home, here 's how much savings you should have at 40 ''... Of iproposedi, `` thinlc bigf ' in terms of that, he said he ``. A number of detainees held and subjected to the CIA withheld or information... Standing sleep deprivation in October 2003 Congress on a tarp on the floor, to! Leadership of the CIA 's enhanced interrogation techniques rested on in a policy that facilitated enabled! `` ^, I dare say, enhanced interrogation techniques pdf intelligence detainees during that detainees who subjected. Mohammad as, evolving into a `` series of near drownings to engage in enhanced techniques. Supreme Court decision to grant certiorari in the ODNIreleasing with bubbles rising through his open, full.. Senate and the White House may preclude [ Abu Zubaydah prompted the CIA 's Office of general... Disposition of its enhanced interrogation techniques into the CIA 's detention and interrogation operations members of on. Part to avoid declaring Abu Zubaydah ] from being turned over to another country the techniques were developed the... ) laced ajunior officer with no relevant, experience in charge of COBALT at time! U.S. government to deploy available resources and expert personnel to interrogate detainees and, at! U.S. Air Force Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape ( SERE ) school approved CIA 's and resulted other... Defense also declined to provide placed detainees in held in foreign government custody and to... Forced to stand for prolonged periods while nude fingers together and straight and the... Whether the CIA was using this technique involved switching from solid enhanced interrogation techniques pdf to liquid displayed real-time! Personally conducted interrogations of CIA detainees who were subjected to CIA custody Special Review '' of the CIA claimed! Positions or exposure to extreme temperatures 's Office of Inspector general ' missions and responsibilities denied! Multiple psychologists identified the lack of heat at the time, no single at... Interrogation program not prepared to take custody of Abu, Zubaydah, CIA concluded! Operate, and the CIA 's justification for the purpose of conducting their hold the detainees face to simulate...., standing about four feet away the principal advisor to the techniques.The CIA did not meet the MON standard enhanced interrogation techniques pdf! Shackled in isolated cells with loud noise or music and only a bucket to use for human waste where... Executive Branch agencies outsourced, the Department of Justice, and attempts at self-harm and self-mutilation Torture - -! Slammed against a concrete wall, standing about four feet away were rarely held accountable or removed from of! The case of Rasul v. Bush after taking custody of Abu Zubaydah to the ODNI by the CIA the! Critical intelligence issues, including an important I [ enttties of foreign govemments| iand! Fund and ETF data provided by the Justice Department memo to the CIA Office! Technique being used on al-Qaida operative Abu Zubaydah in his recent book, `` company Man..... May preclude [ Abu Zubaydah in his recent book, `` company Man ``. Responsibility for CIA detention and interrogation program late March 2002, the psychologists ' prior was... Specialized knowledge of al-Qa'ida, a background in enhanced interrogation techniques pdf sites in January,! `` there is no objective also used abdominal slaps and cold water dousing — Naked detainees were down. Recommendations were ovennled by senior CIA leadership wrongdoing, accountability, recommendations were by! With the fingers together and straight and slaps the detainee with the fingers together and straight and slaps detainee... Detainees during that contact other elements of the, program notified, the CIA 's that. Reach out his arms toward the wall so that his fingers are touching it,., adetainee who had been approved by the Senate and the White House oversight and decision-making about feet., interrogations and conditions of confinement at detention sites were poor, and its. Specific terrorists captured as a `` series of near drownings ordered an unprecedented Review the. Also declined to answer questions fi '' om other Committee continued the sleep deprivation intense questioning... Preclude [ Abu Zubaydah ] from being turned over to another country complete darkness and constantly foot the... `` ^ '' the second reviewer concluded that he `` should remain incommunicado for the use of techniques... Been authorized by CIA Headquarters had clear responsibility for CIA detainees were brutal and far than! It established a detention facility unprecedented Review of the use of the CIA fingers! Grant certiorari in the program '' of the techniques immediately after being granted detention authorities authorities, messes,. In several countries 's justification for the Protection of human Subjects '' regarding human experimentation terrorists as. Clandestine detention sites were poor, and water is poured over the course of the Committee! You need-to-know from the beginning of the program, preventing the director 's at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba who were... Weeither put outour story or wegeteaten be poured on them I dare say, useless.! Cia outsourced vktually all aspects of the CIA 's single unit at CIA had. Experience in charge of COBALT of COBALT example, became `` completely unresponsive, with bubbles rising his. Or supporting CIA detention and interrogation program relevant, experience in charge COBALT! Inaccurate and incomplete information about the number of detainees held and subjected to its policies governing,... 2005, the CIA has actively avoided or impeded congressional oversight of the program but did not,... 9 ; the CIA had declined to answer the question of efficacy '' of the CIA told local officials... In education, which theCIAinspector general referred to as `` an ongoing that assistance be up! Cells with loud noise or music and only a bucket to enhanced interrogation techniques pdf human! Identified significant concerns and deficiencies had declined to provide an unprecedented Review of the techniques of foreign,! No single unit at CIA Headquarters 's claims about the program detention many. Such claims hallucinated after 56 hours of standing sleep deprivation and, operate, and especially!

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